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1 Introduction
Global insurers are exposed to substantial default risk, given the sheer size of losses that
may materialize in the event of financial crises and major catastrophes, such as earth-
quakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks. Commonly used reinsurance counterparty risk
indices1 suggest that default risk is both sizable and time varying, due to occasional
catastrophic losses and wider market conditions affecting insurers’ funding costs. For
example, in the last financial crisis the deterioration of credit markets generated sol-
vency concerns for a number of insurers that had to mark down their assets or step
up liability provisions.2 Although counterparty risk can be reduced by spreading insur-
ance purchases across a large number of insurers, diversification fails in the presence of
systematic risk, as represented by market shocks and catastrophe losses cutting across
different business lines and insurers, and government guarantees are still essential in a
number of situations.3
In this work we study the effect of counterparty default risk on efficient insurance
contracts. The importance of insolvency risk in insurance markets has been emphasized
by several authors (e.g., Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Cummins, Doherty and Lo, 2002),
but fewer studies have considered its impact on the design of optimal risk transfers.
Notable exceptions are represented by Tapiero, Kahane and Jacque (1986), Schlesinger
and Schulenburg (1987), Doherty and Schlesinger (1990), Cummins and Mahul (2003)
and Richter (2003), whose contributions are reviewed more in detail below. As suggested
by Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1987) and Doherty and Schlesinger (1990), default is a
form of contract nonperformance,4 under which the insurance buyer is hit twice: first,
1See, for example, the TRX P&C Reinsurance Index V2, http://communities.thomsonreu-
ters.com/ILS.
2See Thompson (2010) for an analysis of the effects of counterparty risk in credit default swaps.
3Recent examples are the Terrorism Risk and Insurance Act (TRIA) following the 9/11 attacks (see
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2006) and the intervention following Hurricane Katrina (see Kunreuther
and Pauly, 2006).
4Other reasons why insurance contracts may fail to perform are ex-post underwriting and litigation
(claims contested in court, delays in claims payments), or contract conditions introducing delay or
exclusions in claim payments (e.g, probationary periods).
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through the exposure to realized losses, as the indemnity may not be paid in full; second,
through the loss of premium dollars, which introduces positive dependence between the
amount of insurance purchased and the magnitude of default losses. Here we consider
one more channel affecting insurance demand, namely the fact that default may occur in
states of the world associated with low realizations of the insurance buyer’s wealth. Hence
our focus on measures of dependence between the agents’ holdings and the insurable loss.
In our model, insolvency arises endogenously from the interaction of the insurance
premium, the indemnity schedule, and the insurer’s assets. This represents a departure
from the extant literature, where default is typically triggered exogenously and can
therefore be seen as a special form of background risk. Default endogeneity allows us to
better understand the trade-offs that shape efficient insurance contracts, bringing into
the picture the value of the insurer’s default option, which is affected in a nonlinear way
by the insurer’s holdings, the promised coverage level, and the premium size. The main
result of the paper is an explicit characterization of these trade-offs for different forms of
dependence between the risks involved. We find that in several cases efficient contracts
involve retention schedules that are tent-shaped, meaning that smaller and larger risks
are retained, whereas medium sized risks are largely insured. This is consistent with
the empirical evidence on catastrophe reinsurance markets (Froot, 2001; Cummins and
Mahul, 2003) and corporate insurance purchases (Doherty and Smith, 1993).
A more detailed summary of our findings is as follows. We prove that, in the pres-
ence of bankruptcy costs, efficient contracts entail no insurance for some realizations of
the insurable loss. Whether this is in the form of a deductible or an upper limit on
coverage depends on the way the insurance buyer’s wealth is affected by the insurable
loss. When policyholder’s wealth is negatively affected by realized losses, efficient con-
tracts contain deductibles. The intuition is that the dollar premiums saved by retaining
small losses can be used as a buffer in states of the world where default risk is higher
and the policyholder more vulnerable. Hence, aversion to bankruptcy costs alone may
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explain deductibles without requiring the presence of administrative costs (see Raviv,
1979) or background risk (see Dana and Scarsini, 2007). When the policyholder’s wealth
is positively dependent on insurable losses, perhaps because of hedging instruments or
government guarantees, the optimal indemnity gives rise to an upper limit on coverage.
The intuition is that limited liability and bankruptcy costs make insurance demand van-
ish for loss realizations associated with higher default probabilities. The introduction
of bankruptcy costs in a setting where insurance demand is already weak may therefore
explain upper limits, without requiring regulatory constraints (see Raviv, 1979; Jouini,
Schachermayer and Touzi, 2008) or policyholders’ limited liability (see Huberman, May-
ers and Smith, 1983). Irrespective of the sign and degree of dependence between the
insurance buyer’s wealth and the insurable loss, we find that, whenever optimal policies
involve coinsurance, the marginal demand for coverage is shaped in a nontrivial way
by terms accounting for the conditional default probability and the expected loss given
default. This is the case even when background risk is independent of the insurable loss.
The results shed light on some counterintuitive, nonmonotonic relationships between in-
surance demand and default probabilities documented in Doherty and Schlesinger (1990).
When we abstract from bankruptcy costs and focus on the role of limited liability, we
find that insurance demand is almost entirely driven by background risk. The reason is
that in this case there is no loss of premium dollars upon default, and the policyholder
can fully benefit from her claim on the insurer’s residual assets, as the default option is
fairly priced in equilibrium.
The results have both positive and normative implications. On the positive side,
the analysis may shed light on the patterns of (re)insurance purchases documented in
the literature. For example, there is evidence that corporations and primary insurers
tend to retain very large exposures to catastrophic events (see figure 1). Froot (2001)
offers several possible explanations based on different types of frictions (including default
risk) affecting both the demand and the supply side. Cummins and Mahul (2003) give
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an explanation based on the insured and the insurer having divergent assessments of
(exogenous) default probabilities. Our findings may provide a rational explanation of
low insurance demand for high layers of exposure based on counterparty default risk in
an otherwise standard framework. In particular, we show how the indemnity schedules
used in the analysis of Froot (2001) can be endogenized by allowing for bankruptcy risk.
On the normative side, the analysis offers insights into how government intervention
schemes and guarantee funds can be optimally designed (e.g., Jaffee and Russell, 1997;
Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). Finally, some of our analytical results may help assist the
development of (re)insurance programs in the presence of counterparty default risk (e.g.,
CEIOPS, 2009).
Related literature. The article is related to the literature on optimal risk sharing
originated with Borch (1962), Arrow (1963, 1974), and Raviv (1979). Although the
traditional complete market framework has been extended to different forms of mar-
ket incompleteness (see Schlesinger, 2000, for an overview), insurance demand under
insolvency risk has been studied in a limited number of articles.5 Tapiero, Kahane and
Jacque (1986) examine insolvency risk in the context of mutual insurance, and consider
the delicate relationship between premium and default, but do not study optimal indem-
nity schedules. Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1987) use a three-state model to examine
the effects of relative risk aversion and total default on insurance demand. Doherty and
Schlesinger (1990) use a similar setting to show that full insurance is never optimal when
default is total. For more general situations, they find that the relationship between risk
retention levels and default probabilities can be nonmonotonic. Cummins and Mahul
(2003) consider a setting where the insurer and the insurance buyer disagree on the
default probability. They provide conditions under which the risk retention schedule is
nondecreasing in the exposure, but their contract reduces to full insurance above a de-
5In a related contribution, Huberman, Mayers and Smith (1983) consider policyholders with limited
liability (e.g., government intervention). Our analysis encompasses their setup, although in reduced
form; see section 3.
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ductible as soon as disagreement is assumed away. Richter (2003) examines the trade-off
between default risk and basis risk for a primary insurer deciding between reinsurance
and hedging instruments. As opposed to the above contributions, we consider default
as being endogenously determined by the efficient contract and the performance of the
the insurer’s assets. We further allow for randomness in the insurance buyer’s wealth,
as its dependence on default risk plays an important role in shaping optimal insurance
decisions. The work on background risk by Dana and Scarsini (2007) is therefore very
relevant for our study. They do not study limited liability and bankruptcy costs, but
use concepts of positive dependence that prove to be essential for our characterization
of efficient contracts under counterparty default risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model
setup, whereas section 3 recaps three useful concepts of positive dependence between
random variables: association, stochastic increasingness, affiliation. In section 4 we
study optimal indemnity schedules for given premium, distinguishing between when
bankruptcy costs are present and absent. Section 5 extends the analysis to efficient
insurance contracts, optimizing over both the premium level and the indemnity sched-
ule. We provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for optimality, and
hence offer tools to prove the existence of efficient contracts under default risk. Section 6
offers some concluding remarks. All proofs are collected in the appendix, together with
additional details and results.
2 Model setup
We consider a one-period model with two agents, a risk-averse insurance buyer and a
risk-neutral insurer. The insurance buyer has utility function u and end-of-period wealth
W −X, with X representing random losses that can be insured and W ≥ 0 capturing
other variations in wealth. We assume that u is twice continuously differentiable, with
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u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and thatX takes values in the compact interval [0, x]. The exposureX
is insurable, in the sense that an indemnity schedule can be purchased from the insurer
by payment of a premium P ≥ 0. By indemnity we mean a function I(·) : [0, x] →
R+ mapping the coverage level associated with each loss realization. We require the
indemnity to cover at most the realized loss, i.e., to satisfy I ≤ Id, with Id the identity
function. The insurer has terminal wealth A+P , the random variable A ≥ 0 representing
the insurer’s capital at the end of the period. To obtain neater result, we do not allow
for discounting and require the triple (A,W,X) to have continuous positive density6 on
R
2
+ × [0, x]. We denote its marginals by fA, fW and fX , and the conditional density
of (A,W ), given X = x, by f(·|x). We will assume these densities to be differentiable
whenever the analysis requires it.
The insurer defaults on its obligations if total assets, A+P , are insufficient to cover
the promised indemnity, I(X). We assume that on the event {A + P < I(X)} only a
given fraction γ (with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) of the insurer’s assets can be recovered, making the
insurance buyer’s terminal wealth drop from the amount W˜ := W − P −X + I(X) to
the level W˜ (γ) := W − P −X + (A+ P )γ ≤ W˜ . The parameter γ captures deadweight
bankruptcy costs; the extension to non-fractional recovery rules, covered in the appendix,
yields similar results.
An insurance contract is identified by a pair (P, I). By limited liability, it yields the
insurer an expected profit equal to V (P, I) := E(max{A˜, 0}), with A˜ := A+ P − I(X).
On the other hand, the insurance buyer derives expected utility
U(P, I) := E
(
u
(
1
A˜≥0
W˜ + 1
A˜<0
W˜ (γ)
))
. (2.1)
With no bankruptcy costs, the policyholder recovers the entire amount A + P upon
6The point is to avoid using nonsmooth analysis techniques. The essential assumption is that the
conditional law of A, given X = x, is continuous (and if its support is bounded above, that the upper
bound is greater than x). Note that the results for independent W and (A,X) appearing in the next
sections also cover the case of deterministic W .
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default, and the above simplifies to
U(P, I) = E (u(W −X − P +min{I(X), A+ P})) , (2.2)
which is clearly monotone in both P and I, a property that is not satisfied by (2.1) in
general.
The default event is clearly endogenous in this setting, as solvency of the insurer
not only depends on the pair (A,X), but also on the insurance contract (P, I) itself.
The contract may fail to perform and hit the policyholder in three different ways: first,
through a reduction in the indemnity payment, which may drop to (A+P )γ ≤ I(X); sec-
ond, through the loss of premium dollars in the default state; third, because default may
occur in states of the world when the policyholder is more vulnerable (low realizations
of W ).
A contract (P, I) strictly dominates another contract (Pˆ , Iˆ) if U(P, I) ≥ U(Pˆ , Iˆ) and
V (P, I) ≥ V (Pˆ , Iˆ), with at least one inequality strict. A contract is efficient if it is not
strictly dominated. The condition V (P, I) ≥ V (0, 0) = E(A) > 0 is necessary for the
insurer to offer (P, I), whereas U(P, I) ≥ U(0, 0) = E(u(W − X)) is necessary for the
insurance buyer to consider entering the contract. In what follows, we focus on efficient
contracts ensuring that these participation constraints are satisfied.
Efficient contracts can be characterized by examining the solutions of the following
problem for different levels of the insurer’s reservation profit v:


sup(P,I)∈ R+×A U(P, I)
subject to: V (P, I) ≥ v
0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0, x],
(2.3)
where A denotes the set of piecewise continuous functions defined on [0, x] (without
loss of generality, we take them to be left continuous at any points of discontinuity).
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To ensure that the problem is well posed, we assume that the pair (A,W ) is integrable.
Although Pareto efficient contracts are certainly solutions to problem (2.3), it is in general
not obvious whether an optimal policy is also efficient. In case of no bankruptcy costs
(γ = 1), the equivalence of optimality and efficiency is immediate, due to the monotone
behavior of the objective functional pointed out in (2.2). The general case of γ ∈ [0, 1]
is more challenging, and will be addressed in Proposition 5.3 below. It is immediate to
see that condition v ≥ E(A) ensures that the contract is acceptable for the insurer. The
insurance buyer’s participation constraint is less straightforward and will be examined
in section 5.
To understand the role of default endogeneity, it is useful to rewrite the insurer’s
participation constraint as
P ≥ E(I(X)) + (v − E(A))− E(max{I(X)− (A+ P ), 0}). (2.4)
The right-hand side includes the actuarial value of the indemnity, E(I(X)), the insurer’s
required excess return on capital, v − E(A), and the cost (to the insurance buyer) of
the insurer’s option to default, E(min{A+ P − I(X), 0}). Note that an increase in the
coverage level has the effect of increasing both the fair premium and the value (to the
insurer) of the default option; hence limited liability introduces a complex interaction
between the optimal premium and the optimal indemnity schedule. As bankruptcy costs
do not explicitly appear in the right-hand side of (2.4), it is tempting to conclude that, for
insurance to be efficient, the insurance buyer must be sufficiently risk averse to bear both
the expected bankruptcy costs and the extra loading v−E(A). We will prove in section 5,
however, that no insurance is efficient only in degenerate cases, and that constraint
(2.4) is always binding. The reason is that the insurer’s participation constraint can
fully internalize the expected bankruptcy costs, although indirectly, through the optimal
indemnity schedule.
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We develop the analysis of optimal insurance contracts in two steps. We first con-
sider agents that are price takers, and determine optimal indemnity schedules for fixed
premium level P ≥ 0 (section 4). We then undertake the more difficult task of jointly
optimizing with respect to the indemnity schedule and the premium level (section 5).
Before proceeding, we introduce tools to compare different risky prospects.
3 Some concepts of dependence
The results derived in the next sections apply to a large class of risks and decision
makers. To limit parametric assumptions on the utility and distribution functions, we
rely on the following notions of dependence, which impose increasingly strong restrictions
on the dependence structure of a random vector (e.g., Müller and Stoyan, 2002). In the
following, a real valued function defined on Rn is said to be monotone if it is monotone
in each of its arguments. Inequalities between random variables are in the almost sure
sense.
Definition 3.1. A random vector Y is associated, if Cov(g(Y ), k(Y )) ≥ 0 for all pair
of nondecreasing functions g and k such that the covariance exists. A random vector Y
is conditionally associated, given a σ-field G, if Cov(g(Y ), k(Y )|G) ≥ 0 for all pairs
of nondecreasing functions g and k.
We say that a random vector Y is stochastically increasing in another vector Z if
the conditional distribution of Y becomes larger (in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance) when conditioning on higher values of Z.
Definition 3.2. A random vector Y is stochastically increasing (strictly stochasti-
cally increasing) in another random vector Z, denoted Y ↑st Z (Y ↑sst Z), if the map
z → E (g(Y )|Z = z) is nondecreasing (increasing) for every nondecreasing (increasing)
function g such that the expectation of g(Y ) exists.
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We write Y ↓st Z and Y ↓sst Z for the stochastic increasingness relations Y ↑st −Z
and Y ↑sst −Z.
A further characterization of the idea that high values of some of the components of
a random vector make the other components more likely to be high than small is given
by the concept of affiliation (or monotone likelihood ratio property; see Milgrom and
Weber, 1982).
Definition 3.3. A random vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) with joint density f is affiliated if
f is log-supermodular, i.e., if it satisfies
f(y ∧ z)f(y ∨ z) ≥ f(y)f(z) for all y, z ∈ Rn, (3.1)
where y ∧ z and y ∨ z denote the componentwise minimum and maximum of y and z.
The intuition behind (3.1) is that compound returns in one variable are nondecreasing
in each other variable (e.g., Topkis, 1998; Athey, 2002). When f is positive and twice
continuously differentiable, an equivalent characterization of (3.1) can be given in terms
of second order derivatives:
∂2
∂yi∂yj
ln f(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Rn, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n.
Affiliation implies stochastic increasingness (of each component with respect to the oth-
ers), which in turn implies association. An important implication of affiliation is that
the semielasticity of the conditional density f(y−i|yi) with respect to any component yi
is nondecreasing in each other component of y, denoted by y−i; see the appendix. De-
fined as lnyi f(y−i|yi) := ∂/∂yi ln f(y−i|yi), the semielasticity measures the approximate
percentage change in f(·|yi), given a unit increase in the i-th component of y.
For the risk sharing problem at hand, the following situations seem of particular
interest (see Dana and Scarsini, 2007, for several other examples):
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• A and W are conditionally independent, given X (denoted A⊥XW ). This means
that once the insurable loss is taken into account, the residual randomness affecting
the agents’ holdings is idiosyncratic. An example is represented by catastrophic
risks, which may impact the overall economy and introduce dependence between
otherwise uncorrelated endowments.
• A ↑st X and W ↑st X. High losses are likely to make both the insurance buyer and
the insurer better off. This may be the case when the insurer is invested in hedging
instruments (e.g., industry loss warranties) or has access to post-loss financing tools
(e.g., contingent surplus notes, loss equity puts). On the policyholder side, this
may be the case when the insurance buyer holds (say) credit default swaps, or
when the insured event is catastrophic enough to trigger government intervention
(e.g., Huberman et al., 1983).
• A ↓st X and W ↓st X. This represents situations where large losses are more likely
to negatively affect both agents’ holdings, as for catastrophic risks.
• W −X ↓sst X or W −X ↑st X. The first case may capture contagion between the
insurable loss and any uninsurable exposure included in W . The second case may
reflect a situation where the policyholder is overinvested in hedging instruments or
can rely on government guarantees.
• (A,W,−X) is affiliated. This implies that both (A,−X) and (W,−X) are affil-
iated, as well as the stochastic decreasingness relations A ↓st X, W ↓st X. A
further implication is that (A,W ) is affiliated, reflecting the common dependence
of agents’ holdings on (say) macroeconomic conditions.
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4 Optimal insurance policy schedules for given premium
Following Raviv (1979), it is convenient to see (2.3) as an optimal control problem where
the indemnity schedule is the control and the insurer’s expected return is the state
variable. For fixed premium level P ≥ 0, we can use the law of iterated expectations to
write problem (2.3) as


supI∈A
∫ x
0 E
x
(
1
A˜≥0
u(W˜ ) + 1
A˜<0
u(W˜ (γ))
)
fX(x)dx
subject to
∫ x
0 E
x(max{A˜, 0})fX(x)dx ≥ v
0 ≤ I(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0, x],
(4.1)
where Ex(·) denotes the conditional expectation operator E(·|X = x); we write Px(·)
for the conditional probability P(·|X = x). We ensure that the problem is feasible by
considering reservation utility levels satisfying E(A) ≤ v ≤ E(A) + P . To apply the
Maximum Principle, define the Hamiltonian as
H(x, I(x), λ0;P ) := E
x
(
1
A˜≥0
u(W˜ ) + 1
A˜<0
u(W˜ (γ))
)
fX(x) + λ0E
x(max{A˜, 0})fX(x),
where the adjoint variable λ0 ≥ 0 is constant, as the Hamiltonian is not state-dependent,
and satisfies the transversality condition λ0(V (P, I
∗) − v) = 0 (e.g., Seierstad and Syd-
saeter, 1987). Taking into account the constraints on the indemnity schedule, we write
the Lagrangian as
L(x, I(x), λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P ) := H(x, I(x), λ0;P ) + λ1(x)I(x) + λ2(x)(x− I(x)),
for multipliers λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 satisfying the complementarity conditions λ1(x)I(x) = 0 and
λ2(x)(x−I(x)) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x]. If I
∗ is a solution of problem (4.1), I∗(x) maximizes
H(x, ·, λ0;P ) over [0, x] for every x ∈ [0, x].
13
Default risk means that the policyholder may not receive the promised indemnity
schedule, I(X), and may recover only a fraction of the insurer’s residual assets, (A+P )γ.
The utilities derived in the ‘no-default state’ and ‘default state’ differ by ∆u(γ, I) :=
u(W˜ ) − u(W˜ (γ)). For each loss realization x, the expected utility loss incurred at the
default boundary when default occurs can be written as7
Ex(∆u(γ, I)|A˜ = 0) = lim
a↑0
Ex(∆u(γ, I)|A˜ = a)
=
∫
R+
[u(w − P − x+ I(x))− u(w − P − x+ γI(x))] fW (w|A = I(x)− P,X = x)dw,
is nonincreasing in γ and bounded below by Ex(∆u(1, I)|A˜ = 0) = 0 for all admissible
indemnity schedules. The first order necessary conditions can then be characterized by
the following functions:
J(x) := Ex(u′(W − P − x)− λ0), (4.2)
J(x) := Px(A ≥ x− P )Ex
(
u′(W − P )− λ0
∣∣A ≥ x− P )
− fA(x− P |x)E
x
(
∆u(γ, Id)
∣∣A = x− P ) , (4.3)
K(x) := Px(A∗ ≥ 0)Ex
(
u′(W ∗)− λ0
∣∣A∗ ≥ 0)
− fA(I
∗(x)− P |x)Ex
(
∆u(γ, I∗)
∣∣A∗ = 0) , (4.4)
where the terms W ∗,W ∗(γ), A∗ denote the random variables W˜ , W˜ (γ) and A˜ computed
at the optimal schedule I∗. The first two functions quantify the variational trade-off
between insurance supply and demand when the constraints on the indemnity schedule
are binding (I∗(x) = 0 or I∗(x) = x), the last function when the optimal indemnity is
interior. The functions J, J are continuous and coincide with K in zero. Partitioning the
interval (0, x] into the subsets X1 := {x ∈ (0, x] : 0 < I
∗(x) < x}, X2 := {x ∈ (0, x] :
7Note that the expression is not defined on {I(x) < P}. In the following, we often consider expec-
tations conditional on {A˜ = 0}, but they are always pre-multiplied by fA(I(x) − P |x), which clearly
vanishes on {I(x) < P}.
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I∗(x) = x}, X3 := {x ∈ (0, x] : I
∗(x) = 0}, we can summarize the necessary conditions
as follows:
Proposition 4.1. If I∗ is a solution of Problem (4.1), then the following implications
are satisfied for all x ∈ (0, x¯]: if x ∈ X1, then K(x) = 0; if x ∈ X2, then J(x) ≥ 0; if
x ∈ X3, then J(x) ≤ 0.
As an easy corollary, we can identify the extreme case when the optimal contract is
no insurance.
Corollary 4.2. No insurance is optimal for problem (4.1) if and only if v = E(A) + P .
So far we have been discussing necessary optimality conditions, meaning that if a
schedule is optimal, the Hamiltonian will be maximized. In particular, the conditions
of Proposition 4.1 are only necessary for maximality. They would be sufficient if the
Hamiltonian were concave in I(x) for all x, but this is not the case in general (even
when γ = 1). On the other hand, an Arrow-type sufficient condition (e.g., Seierstad
and Sydsaeter, 1987, p. 107) holds in our setting, because the maximized Hamiltonian
does not depend on the state variable. This means that once a schedule satisfying the
conditions of the Maximum Principle is found, it will be optimal. The situation is more
complicated when the premium is no longer a fixed parameter; see Theorem 5.8 for
further discussion.
In the traditional case of no background risk (deterministic A andW ) and no default
risk, both J and J are monotone and may cross zero at most once; see Raviv (1979).
When the pair (A,W ) is random, but no default is considered, the behavior of J, J can be
understood by imposing restrictions on the dependence structure of the triple (A,W,X);
see Dana and Scarsini (2007). In our setting, J and J are in general nonmonotone, may
cross zero several times, and may be difficult to order. In particular, the implications
in Lemma 4.1 cannot be inverted unless additional assumptions are made.8 This not
8Proposition A.3 in the appendix offers partial results in this direction.
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only gives rise to more complex indemnity schedules than commonly examined in the
literature, but makes it hard to characterize optimal solutions in the first place.
Before considering separately the cases of γ = 1 and 0 ≤ γ < 1, we recall some
definitions of common indemnity schedules.
Definition 4.3. For each xˆ ∈ (0, x], if there exists δ > 0 such that, for all ε ∈ (0, δ),
i) xˆ ∈ X3 and xˆ + ε ∈ X1, then xˆ is a generalized deductible (which is called
standard deductible if I∗(xˆ+ ε) = ε);
ii) xˆ ∈ X3 and xˆ + ε ∈ X1, and Id − I
∗ is nonincreasing on [xˆ, x], then xˆ is a
disappearing deductible;
iii) xˆ− ε ∈ X1 and xˆ ∈ X3, then xˆ represents an upper limit on coverage;
iv) xˆ ∈ X2 and xˆ+ ε ∈ X1, then xˆ represents an upper limit on full coverage.
We remark that in general we use the terms ‘deductible’ and ‘upper limit’ locally,
rather than for a contract as a whole, due to the diverse indemnity schedules our setup
may give rise to. Figure 2 depicts an example with both a disappearing deductible and
an upper limit on full coverage.
4.1 No bankruptcy costs
Setting γ = 1, in this section we abstract from bankruptcy costs and emphasize the role
of limited liability. We first characterize interior policy schedules under a differentiability
assumption.
Proposition 4.4. Let γ = 1 and consider a schedule I∗ differentiable on X1. If I
∗ is
optimal, it satisfies the differential equation
I∗′(x) = 1−
δ1(x)− h(x)δ2(x)
δ0(x)− h(x)δ2(x)
, x ∈ X1, (4.5)
16
where the function h(x) is defined in (4.6) below, and the terms δ0, δ1, δ2 are given by
9
δ0(x) := E
x(u′′(W ∗)|A∗ ≥ 0)
δ1(x) := Cov
x(u′(W ∗), lnx f(A,W |x)
∣∣A∗ ≥ 0)
δ2(x) := E
x(u′(W ∗)|A∗ = 0)− Ex(u′(W ∗)|A∗ ≥ 0),
with lnx f(·|x) denoting the semielasticity of f(·|x) with respect to x.
The above result shows that the marginal demand for coverage is shaped by terms
accounting for the dependence structure of (A,W,X) and the insurance buyer’s risk
preferences, exactly as in the case of background risk (e.g., Gollier, 1996; Dana and
Scarsini, 2007). However, all these terms are conditional on no default occurring, and
there is a specific component, h(x)δ2(x), stemming from limited liability. We have that δ2
quantifies the expected loss in marginal utility incurred by crossing the default boundary,
whereas the function h is essentially a hazard rate, defined as
h(x) :=
fA(I
∗(x)− P |x)
Px(A∗ ≥ 0)
= lim
ǫ↓0
P
x(A∗ ≤ ǫ|A∗ ≥ 0)
ǫ
. (4.6)
Under the conditional independence assumption A⊥XW , the term δ2 is null, and both
δ0 and δ1 no longer depend on the event {A
∗ ≥ 0}. In particular, we have δ0(x) =
Ex(u′′(W ∗)) and δ1(x) = Cov
x(u′(W ∗), lnx fW (W |x)). This suggests that limited liabil-
ity may affect indemnity schedules the most when the dependence between A and W is
not channeled by the insurable loss alone. On the other hand, conditional independence
allows us to provide a number of sharper results, as we now show. First, we note that
the lack of concavity of the Hamiltonian means that condition (4.5) is only necessary for
local extrema. To focus on local maxima, we need to impose the second order condition
9Given the random variables X,Y, Z, and the event H, we use the notation Covx(Y, Z|H) for the
conditional covariance of Y and Z, given X and H, computed at X = x.
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(∂2H/∂I(x)2)|I=I∗ = δ0(x) − h(x)δ2(x) ≤ 0, which is always satisfied (striclty) under
the assumption A⊥XW . Second, we can invert the implications of Proposition 4.1, and
thus obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal policies directly based on
comparison of the functions J and J , exactly as in Raviv (1979).
Theorem 4.5. Assume that A⊥XW and γ = 1. If I
∗ is an optimal solution to problem
(4.1) then, for all x ∈ (0, x], one of the following exhaustive and mutually exclusive
conditions is satisfied: x ∈ X1 if and only if J(x) < 0 < J(x); x ∈ X2 if and only if
J(x) ≥ 0; x ∈ X3 if and only if J(x) ≤ 0.
Theorem 4.5 can be used to characterize optimal contracts as follows. Denote by
xi (with i = 1, 2, . . .) the i-th positive zero of either J or J (in the two cases we write
xi = xj or xi = xk, with j, k ≤ i), with the convention that xi = +∞ means that there
are fewer than i zeros. Each xi gives then rise to changes in the indemnity schedule that
can be classified according to Definition 4.3. An illustration is given in Figure 2, which
depicts the behavior of the functions J and J , as well as the optimal policy schedule I∗.
The optimal contract involves a deductible given by the first zero of J , x1 = x1, which
is followed by coinsurance until the first zero of J , x2 = x1. Full insurance then follows,
but the second zero of J , x3 = x2, gives rise to an upper limit on full coverage. (If we had
x3 ≥ x, the contract would be a disappearing deductible.) In this example, the fraction
of exposure that is insured, I∗(x)/x, is tent-shaped: small losses are retained, medium
sized losses are substantially insured, whereas a significant fraction of large losses is
retained (the retention schedule Id− I∗ is increasing from x3 onwards).
Before introducing bankruptcy costs, we use Theorem 4.5 to understand how depen-
dence shapes optimal insurance contracts.
Proposition 4.6. Let I∗ be a solution of problem (4.1) with A⊥XW and γ = 1. We
then have the following results:
i) If W −X ↑sst X, the optimal contract is full insurance, possibly followed by coin-
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surance and no insurance. If in addition (W,X) is affiliated and I∗ is differentiable
on X1, then Id− I
∗ is nondecreasing on X1.
ii) If W ↓st X, the optimal contract has a generalized deductible followed by coin-
surance and possibly full insurance. If in addition (W,−X) is affiliated and I∗ is
differentiable on X1, then Id− I
∗ is nonincreasing on X1.
iii) If W⊥X, the optimal contract is a standard deductible.
The situation of point (iii) is equivalent to imposing the conditionW⊥(A,X), making
clear that independence of policyholder’s wealth is all we need to obtain a standard
deductible. As soon as this assumption is relaxed, optimal policies can take different
forms, depending on the terms δ1, δ0. In particular, points (i) and (ii) show how negative
or positive dependence betweenW andX give rise to nonincreasing or nondecreasing risk
retention schedules, respectively. Note that results (ii) and (iii) encompass the case of no
insurance (which is possible only if v = E(A) +P ) when the deductible satisfies x1 ≥ x.
Points (i) and (iii) encompass full insurance (which is only possible if V (P, Id) ≥ v)
when the deductible is zero and the upper limit on full coverage satisfies x1 ≥ x.
4.2 Bankruptcy costs
The introduction of bankruptcy costs adds a range of interesting features to optimal
indemnity schedules. We can see it immediately by examining interior differentiable
solutions.
Proposition 4.7. For fixed 0 ≤ γ < 1, consider a schedule I∗ differentiable on X1. If
I∗ is optimal, it satisfies the differential equation
I∗′(x) =
δ0(x)− δ1(x)− h(x)(δ5(x, γ)− δ6(x, γ) + δ7(x, γ))
δ0(x)− h(x) (δ2(x) + δ3(x, γ) + δ4(x, γ))
, x ∈ X1, (4.7)
with the terms δ3, δ4, δ5, δ6, δ7 admitting the explicit expressions (B.2)-(B.6) reported in
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the appendix.
Apart from the case of x ∈ X1 ∩ [0, P ], which yields I
∗′(x) = 1 − δ1(x)/δ0(x), the
marginal coverage level is shaped by six more terms than when bankruptcy costs are ab-
sent (compare with Proposition 4.4), demonstrating the complexity of trade-offs solved
by the optimal contract. This provides a rational explanation for some of the appar-
ently counterintuitive results documented in Doherty and Schlesinger (1990), who could
not identify a monotone relationship between insurance demand and the probability of
default.
As in the case with no bankruptcy costs, the differential equation (4.7) only identifies
local extrema for the Hamiltonian. Writing the second order condition, we obtain that
local maxima must in addition satisfy the following inequality on X1:
δ0(x)− fA(I
∗(x)− P |x)δ3(x, γ)− h(x) (δ2(x) + δ4(x, γ) + h(x)) ≤ 0. (4.8)
The stronger condition that A⊥XW and lna f(I
∗(x) − P |x) ≥ −h(x) for all x ∈ X1, a
property used in the next section for the sufficiency of the Maximum Principle optimality
conditions, ensures that the second order condition (4.8) is automatically satisfied.
Although expression (4.7) is daunting, we can understand the salient features of
interior indemnity schedules by elaborating on some special cases.
Proposition 4.8. Let I∗ be a solution of problem (4.1), differentiable on X1. For all
x ∈ X1 we have:
i) If A,W,X are independent, then
I∗′(x) =
δ0(x)− h(x)δ5(x, γ)
δ0(x)− h(x)(δ3(x, γ) + δ4(x, γ))
. (4.9)
ii) If γ = 0, W⊥(A,X), and (A,−X) is affiliated, then Id− I∗ is nondecreasing.
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Although it is in general difficult to characterize the optimal risk retention schedule,
point (ii) shows that it is nondecreasing whenever there is total default and the insurer’s
holdings are negatively dependent on the insurable loss (in the sense of affiliation). Point
(i) demonstrates that bankruptcy costs are incompatible with straight deductibles and
constant coinsurance rates, even when background risk is independent of the insurable
loss; compare with Proposition 4.6(iii). Shutting off the background risk channel is im-
portant to isolate the impact of default endogeneity on coinsurance rates: the result
should be contrasted with Cummins and Mahul (2003, Corollary 2), who obtain opti-
mality of full insurance above a deductible when default is exogenous and there is no
recovery.
Note that with bankruptcy costs the characterization of optimal indemnities provided
by Theorem 4.5 no longer applies, and the optimality conditions do not admit an imme-
diate interpretation in terms of the functions J and J . The main issue is to compare the
functions K and J when J > 0: the behavior of fA(I
∗(x) − P |x)Ex(∆u(γ, I∗)|A∗ = 0)
is difficult to characterize, unless explicit assumptions are made on the utility function
and the conditional law of A. The following results can nonetheless be derived without
imposing further restrictions beyond conditional independence.
Proposition 4.9. Assume A⊥XW , 0 ≤ γ < 1 and consider a solution I
∗ of problem
(4.1) with E(A) ≤ v < E(A) + P . Then, there is insurance and the following hold:
i) If W −X ↑sst X the optimal policy has an upper limit on coverage.
ii) If W ↓st X the optimal policy admits either a generalized deductible or an upper
limit on coverage.
Propositions 4.6 and 4.9 associate upper limits (generalized deductibles) with posi-
tive (negative) dependence between the insurance buyer’s wealth and the insurable loss,
although point (ii) above leaves open the possibility of upper limits in case of negative
dependence and bankruptcy costs. In the next section we will see that deductibles prevail
21
in this situation if premiums are allowed to be set efficiently.
5 Pareto optimal policies
In this section we derive efficient contracts by optimizing with respect to both the pre-
mium level and the indemnity schedule. As is customary in control problems depending
on a parameter, it is convenient to see the premium as an additional state variable. This
means that the previous analysis still applies, but one more optimality condition needs
to be considered: an insurance contract (P ∗, I∗) that is optimal for problem (2.3) must
also satisfy the restriction (e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987)
∫ x
0
∂
∂P
L(x, I∗(x), λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P )
∣∣∣
P=P ∗
dx ≤ 0. (5.1)
The inequality reduces to an equality when P ∗ > 0. A calculation developed in the
appendix shows that in the latter case we have
∫
X2
J(x)fX(x)dx+ (1− γ)E
(
u′(W ∗(γ))1A∗<0
)
=
∫
X3
(−J(x))fX(x)dx, (5.2)
where (1− γ)E (u′(W ∗(γ))1A∗<0) is nonnegative, and equal to zero if and only if γ = 1
or I∗(x) ≤ P ∗ for all x. Note that in this case the optimal policy does not satisfy the
insurance buyer’s participation constraint, as one can show that U(P, I) < U(0, 0) for
all insurance contracts with coverage bounded by the (positive) premium.
Recalling that J(x) ≥ 0 on X2, and J(x) ≤ 0 on X3, from (5.2) we see that the no
insurance region is used to balance the provision of full insurance and the expected loss
of marginal utility arising from bankruptcy costs. This allows us to make the following
general statement.
Proposition 5.1. When 0 ≤ γ < 1, any efficient contract must provide no insurance
on a set of positive measure.
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Hence bankruptcy costs are incompatible with full insurance, with coinsurance, and
with indemnity schedules that offer a mixture of full and partial coverage against loss
realizations. In other words, insurance contracts must provide deductibles and/or upper
limits on coverage to be efficient.
In the absence of bankruptcy costs, the impact of limited liability is less dramatic and
the joint provision of full insurance and no insurance is essentially driven by background
risk. As the following proposition shows, the way the insurance buyer’s wealth is affected
by the insurable loss is particularly relevant in this context.
Proposition 5.2. Let γ = 1 and assume that eitherW ↓st X orW−X ↑sst X (W ↓sst X
or W ↑sst X) holds. Then any efficient contract offering no insurance (full insurance)
on a set of positive measure must offer full insurance (no insurance) on a nonnegligible
set.
The previous results allow us to finally establish the efficiency of policies that are
optimal for problem (2.3). As the following proposition shows, the insurer’s participation
constraint is binding at an optimum and hence the intuitive premium representation
discussed in section 2 applies.
Proposition 5.3. For fixed v ≥ E(A), let (P ∗, I∗) be optimal for problem (2.3). Then,
the optimal premium P ∗ is related to the optimal schedule I∗ by
P ∗ = E(I∗(X)) + (v − E(A))− E(max{I∗(X)− (A+ P ∗), 0}), (5.3)
and the optimal pair (P ∗, I∗) is an efficient contract.
As was discussed in section 2, the fact that bankruptcy costs do not explicitly appear
in expression (5.3) may suggest that the insurance buyer may not have an incentive to
trade if risk aversion is not high enough to offset both the expected bankruptcy costs
and the insurer’s required return on capital. It turns out, however, that the insurer’s
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participation constraint fully internalizes both aspects, although indirectly, via the op-
timal indemnity schedule, and no insurance can only be optimal in degenerate cases.
The next proposition shows that there is always insurance, for example, when W ↓st X
(which encompasses W⊥X) or W −X ↑sst X (which implies W ↑sst X).
Proposition 5.4. If no insurance is efficient, then Ex(u′(W − x)) is constant.
To obtain sharper results on Pareto optimal contracts, it is convenient to work under
the conditional independence assumption A⊥XW , exactly as we did in section 4. The
structure of efficient policies crucially depends on the way the insurance buyer’s wealth
is affected by the insurable loss. We focus first on the case of negative dependence and
no bankruptcy costs.
Theorem 5.5. Assume A⊥XW and W ↓st X. If γ = 1, any efficient contract is either
full insurance or admits a generalized deductible followed by first coinsurance and then
full insurance. We further have:
i) If (W,−X) is affiliated, efficient contracts are disappearing deductibles.
ii) If W⊥X, full insurance is efficient.
Comparing the above results with those of Theorem 4.6, we see that generalized de-
ductibles are followed by coinsurance and full insurance if premiums are set efficiently.
Moreover, the efficient premium level makes the deductible vanish in the case of indepen-
dence. We notice that when there are no bankruptcy costs background risk is the main
factor shaping efficient contracts, and efficient policies are remarkably similar to those
arising in the absence of limited liability (e.g., Gollier, 1996; Dana and Scarsini, 2007).
The intuition is that the contract gives the policyholder a claim on the insurer’s residual
assets, thus allowing the risk averse agent to extend her balance sheet in case of default.
As the insurer’s default option is fairly priced via (5.3), and there are no premium losses
upon default, insurance demand is essentially unaffected by default risk.
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The situation changes when introducing bankruptcy costs. As the insurer’s participa-
tion constraint does not explicitly take into account the expected bankruptcy costs, the
insurance buyer needs to adjust the demand for coverage to internalize expected default
costs. An immediate consequence is that insurance demand becomes weaker for large
loss realizations associated with higher default risk. More importantly, there is always a
positive deductible, even in the independence case. The intuition is that the insurance
buyer reduces the potential loss in premium dollars by giving up coverage for low loss
realizations. As a result, we have that bankruptcy costs may explain deductibles without
requiring the introduction of administrative costs or even background risk. Moreover, ef-
ficient risk retention schedules can be nondecreasing, giving rise to a tent-shaped pattern
in the fraction I∗(x)/x of exposure insured. We prove this for the case of total default,
γ = 0, which is easier to analyze.
Theorem 5.6. Assume A⊥XW and W ↓st X. If 0 ≤ γ < 1, any efficient contract
involves a positive deductible. In particular, we have:
i) If W⊥X, the deductible is followed by coinsurance.
ii) If W⊥X, γ = 0 and (A,−X) is affiliated, then the risk retention schedule Id− I∗
is nondecreasing on X1.
Finally, we consider the case when the policyholder’s wealth is positively dependent
on the insurable loss, which may capture (in reduced form) the limited liability con-
straints studied by Huberman, Mayers and Smith (1983), or may reflect the fact that
the buyer is partially hedged against the insurable loss. In this case we obtain the natural
result that limited liability and bankruptcy costs make insurance demand vanish for loss
realizations associated with higher default probabilities. As a result, bankruptcy costs
may explain upper limits in situations where insurance demand is naturally weak.
Theorem 5.7. Assume A⊥XW and W−X ↑sst X. Then any efficient contract involves
full insurance followed by coinsurance and no insurance.
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Some numerical examples for the efficient schedule I∗(x) and insured fraction I∗(x)/x
are presented in figures 3-4. We use exponential utility and work under the assumption of
independence, with lognormalA,W , andX distributed according to a truncated Gamma.
Although efficient indemnity schedules do not present an upper limit on coverage, the
indemnity flattens out for high loss realizations, tending towards a ‘stop-loss contract’.
Taking into account the presence of deductibles, we have therefore an example of how
the insurance layers considered in Froot (2001) can be endogenized by simply allowing
for bankruptcy costs.
We conclude this section by addressing the issue of sufficiency of the optimality
conditions discussed so far. As opposed to section 4, the problem is now more challenging,
as the premium level is an additional state variable and hence the optimized Hamiltonian
does depend on the state. The following theorem, however, shows that an Arrow-type
sufficiency result can be obtained under mild conditions.
Theorem 5.8. Let (Pˆ , Iˆ) be an admissible contract, with λˆ0 ≥ 0 the corresponding
adjoint constant, and suppose that condition (5.1) is satisfied. Let A⊥XW and assume
that either of the following conditions hold:
i) there are no bankruptcy costs, γ = 1;
ii) there is total default, γ = 0, and lna fA(Iˆ(x)− Pˆ |x) ≥ −h(x) for all x ∈ [0, x].
Then, (Pˆ , Iˆ) is optimal if and only if H(x, Iˆ(x), λˆ0; Pˆ ) = maxz∈[0,x]H(x, z, λˆ0; Pˆ ) for all
x ∈ [0, x].
A simple calculation shows that the condition lna fA(Iˆ(x)− Pˆ |x) ≥ −h(x) is satisfied
if, for all x ∈ [0, x], the hazard rate fA(a|x)/P
x(A ≥ a) is nondecreasing on the interval
[0,max(0, Iˆ(x)− Pˆ )]. In other words, the candidate contract (Pˆ , Iˆ) cannot offer coverage
above the premium level whenever the insurer’s hazard rate is decreasing. Note that
condition (ii) automatically ensures that the second order condition (4.8) is satisfied.
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Theorem 5.8 can be used to ensure existence of efficient contracts on a case by case
basis. Without giving all the details, the verification procedure would involve the follow-
ing steps. We would first identify the zeros of J and J . In case X1 6= ∅, we would then
ensure the existence of solutions to the relevant ODEs (with the appropriate boundary
conditions) satisfied by differentiable interior schedules, for example via Lipschitz con-
ditions. We would then verify that points (i)-(ii) above as well as all the conditions of
the Maximum Principle are satisfied. As a result, we would have identified a candidate
contract that satisfies all the sufficiency conditions and is therefore efficient.
6 Conclusion
In this work we have characterized efficient insurance contracts when a representative
insurer can default on its obligations and the representative insurance buyer is risk-
averse. We have shown how bankruptcy costs can explain the presence of deductibles and
upper limits in efficient contracts, thus endogenizing the contracts often considered in the
empirical literature studying the aggregate risk retention levels observed in catastrophe
reinsurance markets. We have also demonstrated how default risk may give rise to non-
monotonic relationships between the marginal demand for insurance and conditional
default probabilities, consistently with what was pointed out in Doherty and Schlesinger
(1990). The analysis is based on a static model with symmetric information. Our results
are therefore just a first step towards understanding how couterparty default risk may
affect efficient insurance premiums and indemnity schedules in the presence of additional
frictions. Extensions to a dynamic setting and to include information asymmetries seem
of particular interest. For example, it would be natural to allow for recapitalization, or
to model the representative insurer as having superior information on the quality and
adequacy of her assets. These aspects will be the object of future research.
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Appendix
A Additional discussion and results
A.1 Further results on dependence
The proofs of the main results (appendix B) rely on some consequences of the dependence
concepts introduced in section 3. We begin by elaborating on the relation between
association and stochastic increasingness.
Proposition A.1. Let X, Y, Z be univariate random variables. Then, the following
properties hold:
i) X is associated conditionally on Y , and (X,Y ) is associated conditionally on
(Y, Z);
ii) if X ↑st (Y, k(Z)) for strictly monotone function k, then (X,Y ) is associated con-
ditionally on Z;
iii) If Z ↑st (k(X), Y ) for strictly monotone function k, then for every nondecreasing
function f we have Ex(f(Y, Z)|Y ≥ 0) ≥ Ex(f(Y, Z)|Y = 0) for all x such that
P
x(Y ≥ 0) > 0.
Proof. Part i) follows directly from the fact that any univariate random variable is as-
sociated. To prove part ii), consider nondecreasing functions f and g. We have
Cov(f(X,Y ), g(X,Y )|Z) =E(Cov(f(X,Y ), g(X,Y )|Y, Z)|Z)
+ Cov(E(f(X,Y )|Y, Z), E(g(X,Y )|Y, Z)|Z).
The first term is nonnegative by i). With regard to the second term, we have that
f˜(y, z) := E(f(X,Y )|Y = y, Z = z) is nondecreasing in y, and likewise g˜(y, z) :=
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E(g(X,Y )|Y = y, Z = z) is nondecreasing in y. It follows again by i) that
Cov(E(f(X,Y )|Y, Z), E(g(X,Y )|Y, Z)|Z) = Cov(f˜(Y, Z), g˜(Y, Z)|Z) ≥ 0.
Part iii) follows from observing that
Ex(f(Y, Z)|Y ≥ 0) =
1
Px(Y ≥ 0)
∫ ∞
0
Ex(f(y, Z)|Y = y)FY (dy|x),
where FY (·|x) is the conditional law of Y , given X = x, and from the fact that the
function y 7→ Ex(f(y, Z)|Y = y) is nondecreasing in y.
The next proposition shows why we need to resort to the stronger notion of affiliation
to study the marginal demand for insurance when it is driven by semielasticities.
Proposition A.2. Let X, Y, Z be random variables with joint density h, and let h(·|z)
denote the conditional density of (X,Y ) given Z = z. Then, the following properties
hold:
i) If (X,Y, Z) is affiliated, the conditional density function h(x, y|z) is log-supermodular.
ii) If X and Y are independent conditionally on Z, then (X,Y, Z) is affiliated if and
only if (X,Z) and (Y, Z) are affiliated.
iii) If (X,Y, Z) ((X,Y,−Z)) is affiliated, the semielasticity lnz h(x, y|z) is nondecreas-
ing (nonincreasing) in x, y.
Proof. Part i) is obvious. Part ii) follows from the fact that by conditional independence
we have h(x, y, z) = hX(x|z)hY (y|z)hZ(z), where hX(·|z) and hY (·|z) are the conditional
densities of X and Y given Z = z, and hZ is the density of Z. Part iii) follows from the
observation that, for example, ∂
∂x
lnz h(x, y|z) =
∂
∂x∂z
lnh(x, y, z) ≥ 0.
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A.2 Characterizing the behavior of J, J,K.
In section 4 we have shown that the presence of bankruptcy costs prevents us from fully
characterizing optimal indemnities in terms of the zeros of the the functions J, J,K,
even when working under the conditional independence assumption A⊥XW . The next
proposition collects a number of results that can be obtained in different cases.
Proposition A.3. For x ∈ (0, x¯], let I∗ be a solution of Problem (4.1). Then, the
following properties hold:
1. If J(x) < 0 < J(x), then x ∈ X1.
2. When A⊥XW , we have: (i) if J(x) ≥ 0, then J(x) > 0; (ii) if J(x) ≤ 0, then
K(x) < 0, J(x) < 0 and x ∈ X3; (iii) if x ∈ X1, then J(x) > 0.
3. When A⊥XW and γ = 1, we have: (j) x ∈ X1 if and only if J(x) < 0 < J(x); (jj)
x ∈ X2 if and only if J(x) ≥ 0; (jjj) x ∈ X3 if and only if J(x) ≤ 0.
4. If x ≤ P then (3.j), (3.jj), and (3.jjj) always hold.
Proof. Part (1) follows directly from Theorem 4.1. To prove part (2), note first that
under A⊥XW we have
J(x) = Px(A ≥ x− P )Ex(u′(W − P )− λ0)− fA(x− P |x)E
x(∆u(γ, Id))
K(x) = Px(A∗ ≥ 0)Ex(u′(W ∗)− λ0)− fA(I
∗(x)− P |x)Ex(∆u(γ, I∗)).
We also note that
Ex(u′(W − P )− λ0) ≤ E
x(u′(W − P − x+ I∗(x))− λ0)
≤ Ex(u′(W − P − x)− λ0) = J(x), (A.1)
where the first inequality is strict if I∗(x) < x, the second one if I∗(x) > 0. Finally, we
have Px(A ≥ z) > 0 for all z. Hence (i), (ii) and (iii) immediately follow. To prove
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part (3.jj), let γ = 1 and assume J(x) ≥ 0. If I∗(x) = 0, then J(x) ≤ 0 but (A.1) gives
J(x) > 0. If 0 < I∗(x) < x, we then have K(x) = 0, but (A.1) implies J(x) < 0. It then
follows that I∗(x) = x is the only admissible case and (jj) is proved. Points (j) and (jjj)
can be proved in a similar way.
Finally, part (4) follows from the fact that for x ≤ P we have J(x) ≤ K(x) ≤ J(x), the
first inequality being strict if I∗(x) < x, the second one if I∗(x) > 0.
A.3 Beyond fractional recovery rules
The assumption of fractional recovery can be relaxed without affecting the main conclu-
sions of the paper. Let Γ be a smooth, nonnegative function defined on R+ and satisfying
Γ ≤ Id. We assume that on the default event {A+ P < I(X)} the insurance buyer re-
covers Γ(A+P ). The relevant random variables depending on the recoverable assets are
redefined accordingly; for example, W (γ) is replaced byW (Γ) := W −P −X+Γ(A+P ).
Then all the results on optimal indemnity schedules for given premium appearing in sec-
tion 4 still apply, provided the condition γ = 1 (no bankruptcy costs) is replaced with
Γ = Id, the condition 0 ≤ γ < 1 (bankruptcy costs) with Γ 6= Id. As for Pareto efficient
contracts, the optimality condition (5.2) now takes the form
∫
X2
J(x)fX(x)dx+ E
(
(1− Γ′(A+ P ∗))u′(W ∗(Γ))1A∗<0
)
=
∫
X3
(−J(x))fX(x)dx.
All the results given in section 5 still apply, provided the additional condition Γ′ ≤ 1 is
satisfied.
B Proofs
B.1 Proofs for section 4
Proposition 4.1
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Proof. For fixed x ∈ [0, x] and P ≥ 0, the Hamiltonian can be written as
H(x, I(x), λ0;P ) = [U
x(P, I) + λ0V
x(P, I)] fX(x)
where V x(P, I) := Ex(max{A˜, 0}) and Ux(P, I) is similarly defined. The multiplier λ0 ≥
0 is constant, as the Hamiltonian is not state-dependent, and the participation constraint∫ x
0 V
x(P, I)fX(x)dx ≥ v induces the transversality condition λ0(V (P, I) − v) = 0. The
Lagrangian is then given by
L(x, I(x), λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P ) = H(x, I(x), λ0;P ) + λ1(x)I(x) + λ2(x)(x− I(x)),
for multipliers λ1, λ2 ≥ 0 satisfying λ1(x)I(x) = 0, λ2(x)(x− I(x)) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x].
As the conditional distribution of A, given X, is continuous, we can differentiate the
Lagrangian with respect to I(x), to obtain
∂
∂I
L(x, I(x), λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P ) =E
x(1
A˜≥0
(u′(W˜ )− λ0))fX(x)
− fA(I(x)− P |x)E
x(∆u(γ, I)|A˜ = 0)fX(x) + λ1(x)− λ2(x).
(B.1)
Fix now x ∈ (0, x]. Assume that 0 < I∗(x) < x, so that λ1(x) = λ2(x) = 0 and the
first order condition reads as K(x) = 0, with K defined in (4.4). Next consider the case
I∗(x) = 0, which implies λ2(x) = 0. As λ1(x) ≥ 0 and fX > 0 on [0, x], the first order
condition now reads J(x) = − λ1(x)
fX(x)
≤ 0, with J(x) defined in (4.2). Finally, consider
the case I∗(x) = x, so that λ1(x) = 0. As λ2(x) ≥ 0, and fX > 0 on [0, x], we can write
the first order condition as J(x) = λ2(x)
fX(x)
≥ 0, with J(x) defined in (4.3).
Proposition 4.1
Proof. If v = E(A) + P then no insurance is the only feasible contract. Conversely, if
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I∗ ≡ 0 is optimal then V (P, I∗) = E(A) + P ≥ v. If E(A) + P > v then λ0 = 0 and
J(x) = Ex(u′(W − P − x)) > 0, thus contradicting Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.4
Proof. When γ = 1, the function K simplifies to
K(x) = Ex
(
(u′(W ∗)− λ0)1A∗≥0
)
.
Noting that K(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X1, by total differentiation we get
I∗′(x) =
fA(I
∗(x)− P |x)Ex(u′(W ∗)− λ0|A
∗ = 0)− Px(A∗ ≥ 0)Ex(u′′(W ∗)|A∗ ≥ 0)
Ex((u′(W ∗)− λ0) lnx f(A,W |x)1A∗≥0)− Px(A∗ ≥ 0)Ex(u′′(W ∗)|A∗ ≥ 0)
,
where we have used the fact that I∗ is differentiable on X1. Replacing λ0 recovered again
from K(x) = 0, and rearranging terms, we finally obtain (4.5).
Theorem 4.5
Proof. See Proposition A.3.
Theorem 4.6
Proof. i). We first note that under W −X ↑sst X both J(x) and E
x(u′(W − P ) − λ0)
are decreasing. If J(0) ≤ 0 then J(x) < 0 on (0, x] and the optimal contract is no
insurance, which can be the case only if v = E(A) + P . In all other cases we must
then have J(0) > 0. If J(x¯) ≥ 0, the optimal contract is full insurance, which can
only be the case if V (P, Id) ≥ v ≥ E(A). In the remaining cases we have J(x¯) < 0,
meaning that J crosses zero once at x1 ∈ (0, x) and I
∗ is full insurance on [0, x1]. Now,
either J(x¯) > 0, in which case I∗ is coinsurance on (x1, x¯], or J(x¯) ≤ 0, meaning that
J crosses zero once at x1 ∈ (x1, x¯]. In the latter case the contract is coinsurance on
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X1 = (x1, x1) and no insurance on X3 = [x1, x¯]. Assume now that (W,X) is affiliated.
By the conditional independence assumption A⊥XW , we have that I
∗′(x) = 1− δ1(x)
δ0(x)
on
X1, with δ1(x) given by Cov
x(u′(W ∗), lnx fW (W |x)). As lnx f(w|x) is nondecreasing in
w by Proposition A.2 and u′ is decreasing, by Proposition A.1 we have δ1(x) ≤ 0. This
means that I∗′ ≤ 1 on X1, and hence Id− I
∗ is nondecreasing.
ii). By W ↓st X we have that J(x) is increasing and E
x(u′(W − P )− λ0) is nonde-
creasing. If J(0) ≥ 0, we have that J is nonnegative and hence the optimal contract is
full insurance, which can only be the case for V (P, Id) ≥ v. If J(0) < 0 and J(x¯) ≤ 0
the optimal contract is no insurance, which can only occur if v = E(A) + P . Let us
then consider the case of J(0) < 0 and J(x¯) > 0, meaning that J crosses zero once at
x1 ∈ (0, x¯). The optimal contract is then no insurance on X3 = [0, x1]. If J crosses zero
at x1 = inf{x ∈ [0, x] : J(x) = 0}, we have X1 = (x1, x1) and X2 = [x1, x]. If instead J
is strictly negative, no insurance is followed by coinsurance, X1 = (x1, x]. An argument
similar to the one in i) shows that if (W,−X) is affiliated then Id− I∗ is nonincreasing
on X1.
iii). If W⊥(A,X), the same conclusions in (ii) apply, but now the sign of J is
constant and coinsurance followed by full insurance can be excluded. As δ1 = 0, the
result follows.
Proposition 4.7
Proof. Proceeding as in Proposition 4.4, lengthy calculations yield (4.7), with the terms
δ3, δ4, δ5, δ6, δ7 admitting the following explicit expressions:
δ3(x, γ) :=
Ex(∆u(γ, I∗)|A∗ = 0)
Px(A∗ ≥ 0)
, (B.2)
δ4(x, γ) :=
∂
∂I(x)
Ex(∆u(γ, I)|A∗ = 0)
∣∣∣
I=I∗
(B.3)
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δ5(x, γ) := E
x(u′(W ∗)− u′(W ∗(γ))|A∗ = 0) (B.4)
δ6(x, γ) := Cov
x(∆u(γ, I∗), lnx f(I
∗(x)− P,W |x)
∣∣A∗ = 0) (B.5)
δ7(x, γ) := E
x(∆u(γ, I∗)|A∗ = 0)
[
Ex(lnx f(A,W |x)
∣∣A∗ ≥ 0)− Ex(lnx f(A,W |x)|A∗ = 0)] .
(B.6)
Proposition 4.8
Proof. (i). If A,W,X are independent, we have δ1 = δ2 = δ6 = δ7 = 0. The result
then follows by (4.7). (ii). We first note that by W⊥(A,X) we have δ1 = δ2 = δ6 = 0.
Rearranging terms in (4.7), we obtain
I∗′(x) = 1 +
h(x)(δ5(x, γ)− δ4(x, γ)− δ3(x, γ) + δ7(x, γ))
|δ0(x)|+ h(x)(δ3(x, γ) + δ4(x, γ))
.
As γ = 0, we also have δ4(x, 0) = E
x(u′(W ∗)) > 0, and δ5(x, 0)− δ4(x, 0) < 0. We also
have δ3 > 0 and δ7 ≤ 0. To show the latter, note that affiliation of (A,−X) implies
that lnx fA(·|x) is nonincreasing (see Proposition A.2), and hence by Proposition A.1 we
obtain
δ7(x, 0) = E
x(∆u(0, I∗))
(
Ex(lnx fA(A|x)|A
∗ ≥ 0)− Ex(lnx fA(A|x)|A
∗ = 0)
)
≤ 0.
Putting everything together, we finally obtain I∗′(x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ X1, and hence
Id− I∗ is nondecreasing on X1.
Proposition 4.9
Proof. (i). If W −X ↑sst X, then J and E
x(u′(W −P )−λ0) are decreasing. If J(0) ≤ 0
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then J ≤ 0 and, by proposition A.3, the contract would be no insurance, which would
require v = E(A) + P . Assume therefore J(0) > 0, meaning that I∗ 6= 0 and that the
premium level P is positive, as we must have V (P, I∗) ≥ v ≥ E(A). By continuity of
J and Proposition A.3 the contract is initially full insurance. If J(x) > 0, then I∗ > 0
for all x and it is coinsurance on every interval where J < 0. If instead J(x) ≤ 0, then
J crosses zero once at x1 ∈ (0, x] and X3 = [x1, x]. On the remaining subsets of the
support of X the contract is either coinsurance (if J < 0) or full insurance (necessarily
on J ≥ 0).
(ii). If W ↓st X then E
x(u′(W − P ) − λ0) is nondecreasing. In addition, we have
W −X ↓sst X and hence J is increasing. Consider first the case J(0) ≥ 0, meaning that
J > 0 on (0, x], so that X3 is empty and P > 0, because V (P, I
∗) ≥ v ≥ E(A). By
Proposition A.3 the contract is initially full insurance, and then coinsurance (if J < 0)
alternates with full insurance (necessarily on J ≥ 0). Consider next the case J(0) < 0.
First, we note that J(x) > 0, for otherwise the contract would be no insurance, thus
requiring v = E(A) + P . Then J crosses zero once at x1 ∈ (0, x) and, by proposition
A.3, X3 = (0, x1]. As J is continuous, by Proposition A.3, no insurance is followed by
coinsurance. The remaining contract may alternate coinsurance with full insurance.
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B.2 Proofs for section 5
Derivation of expression (5.2)
Proof. For x ∈ X1, we have
∂
∂P
L(x, I∗(x), λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P ) =
[
fA(I
∗(x)− P |x)Ex(∆u(γ, I∗)|A∗ = 0)
− Ex(u′(W ∗)1A∗≥0)− (1− γ)E
x(u′(W ∗(γ))1A∗<0) + λ0P
x(A∗ ≥ 0)
]
fX(x)
=−K(x)fX(x)− (1− γ)E
x(u′(W ∗(γ))1A∗<0)fX(x).
Similarly, for x ∈ X2 we can write
∂
∂P
L(x, x, λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P ) = −J(x)fX(x)− (1− γ)E
x(u′(W˜ (γ))1A<x−P )fX(x),
whereas for x ∈ X3 we have (∂/∂P )L(x, 0, λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P ) = −J(x)fX(x). Noting
that for I = I∗ the function K is null on X1, we can then write the necessary condition
for an optimum as
∫ x
0
∂
∂P
L(x, I∗(x), λ0, λ1(x), λ2(x);P )
∣∣∣
P=P ∗
dx =
∫
X2
(−J(x))fX(x)dx+
∫
X3
(−J(x))fX(x)dx
− (1− γ)E(u′(W ∗(γ))1A∗<0) ≤ 0,
where the inequality holds with equality if P ∗ > 0.
Proposition 5.1
Proof. If 0 ≤ γ < 1, the term (1 − γ)E(u′(W ∗(γ))1A∗<0) is always positive, unless
I∗(x) ≤ P ∗ for all x ∈ [0, x]. If that were the case, however, there would be no insurance,
as it can be easily shown that U(0, 0) > U(P, I) for all contracts (P, I) such that I(x) ≤ P
for all x and P > 0. If there is insurance, the left hand side of (5.2) is therefore positive.
But then we must have
∫
X3
(−J(x))fX(x)dx > 0.
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Proposition 5.2
Proof. If γ = 1, the term (1 − γ)E(u′(W ∗(γ))1A∗<0) in condition (5.2) is always null.
Consider first the case either W ↓st X or W − X ↑sst X hold. If (P
∗, I∗) provides no
insurance on a nonnegligible set, then the right hand side of (5.2) is positive, as now J
is increasing (if W ↓st X) or decreasing (if W −X ↑sst X) and nonpositive on X3. For
equality to hold in (5.2), we then need
∫
X2
J(x)fX(x)dx > 0. The case in which either
W ↓st X or W − X ↑sst X hold is proved similarly, by noting that J is increasing (if
W ↓sst X) or decreasing (if W ↑sst X) and nonnegative on X2.
Proposition 5.3
Proof. Assume that (P ∗, I∗) solves (2.3) and the constraint (2.4) is not binding, that
is V (P ∗, I∗) > v ≥ E(A), so that P ∗ > 0 and λ0 = 0. When γ = 1, this is clearly a
contradiction, as we could increase the insured’s expected utility by lowering the pre-
mium. When 0 ≤ γ < 1, we know by Proposition 5.1 that the contract must pro-
vide no insurance for some loss realization, but this contradicts Proposition 4.1, as
J(x) = Ex(u′(W − P ∗ − x)) > 0 for all x when λ0 = 0. Now, assume that (P
∗, I∗)
is not efficient. This means there is a contract (P˜ , I˜) which dominates (P ∗, I∗). By
optimality and inefficiency of (P ∗, I∗) we must then have U(P˜ , I˜) = U(P ∗, I∗) and
V (P˜ , I˜) > V (P ∗, I∗) ≥ v. This means that (P˜ , I˜) is also optimal. Slackness of the
state constraint, however, would give a contradiction, as discussed in the first part of the
proof.
Proposition 5.4
Proof. Let (P = 0, I = 0) be efficient. Then it is optimal for v = E(A). We then have
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X3 = (0, x], and hence
J(x) = Ex(u′(W − x))− λ0 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, x]. (B.7)
On the other hand, condition (5.2) implies
∫
X3
(−J(x))fX(x)dx− (1− γ)E(u
′(W −X)1A<0) = λ0 − E(u
′(W −X)) ≤ 0. (B.8)
From (B.7)-(B.8) we obtain |E(J(X))| ≤ 0, and the result follows.
In particular, ifW ↓st X (ifW−X ↑sst X) then E
x(u′(W−x)) is increasing (decreasing).
In both cases the contract (P = 0, I = 0) cannot be efficient.
Theorem 5.5
Proof. Under the assumptions A⊥XW and γ = 1 we can use Theorem 4.5 to characterize
the optima in terms of the zeros of J, J . By Proposition 5.4 W ↓st X implies that no
insurance is never efficient. Also, J is increasing and J(x) is given by Ex(u′(W − P ∗)−
λ0)P
x(A > x− P ∗), with Ex(u′(W − P ∗)− λ0) nondecreasing. If J(0) > 0, then J > 0
and X2 = (0, x¯], thus contradicting (5.2). If J(0) = 0, then J ≥ 0, and there is full
insurance. If J(0) < 0, then J must cross zero and there is therefore a deductible,
followed by first coinsurance and then full insurance (by Proposition 5.2).
i) The assumption that (W,−X) is affiliated implies W ↓st X (see section 3), and the
previous analysis applies. By Proposition 4.6 we also have that Id− I∗ is nonincreasing
on X1. By Definition 4.3 efficient contracts are disappearing deductibles.
ii) As we work under the assumption A⊥XW , if W⊥X we have that E
x(u′(W − P ∗)−
λ0|A ≥ x−P
∗) = E(u′(W −P ∗)−λ0), and hence the sign of J is constant. If J(0) < 0,
then J < 0, whereas J is initially negative and crosses zero once. Hence a deductible
can be followed by coinsurance only, contradicting Proposition 5.2. The only remaining
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possibility is therefore J(0) = 0, in which case J is nonnegative and J is null on [0, x];
there is therefore full insurance.
Theorem 5.6
Proof. By Proposition 5.4 the assumption W ↓st X implies that no insurance cannot
be efficient, i.e., X3 6= (0, x¯]. On the other hand, by Proposition 5.1, we know that no
insurance must be offered on a set of positive measure and hence X3 6= ∅.
The assumption W ↓st X implies W − X ↓sst X and hence J is increasing; the case
J(0) ≥ 0 can therefore be excluded, as it contradicts Proposition 5.1. Let us assume
J(0) < 0. J must then cross zero once, for otherwise the contract would be no insurance
by Proposition A.3. Letting x1 denote the zero of J , we have X3 = (0, x1]. If J < 0 for
all x ∈ [0, x], then X1 = (x1, x¯]; otherwise we have that the contract is coinsurance (if
J < 0) and full insurance (only if J ≥ 0).
(i) The assumption W⊥X implies that J < 0, because J(0) < 0 and hence J(x) =
J(0)Px(A > x − P ∗) − fA(x − P
∗|x)E(∆u(γ, Id)) < 0. We have therefore coinsurance
on the set (x1, x¯].
(ii) If W⊥X, γ = 0, and (A,−X) affiliated, we can use Propositions 4.8 to obtain the
result.
Theorem 5.7
Proof. By Proposition 5.4,W−X ↑sst X implies that no insurance cannot be efficient, i.e.
X3 6= (0, x¯], and P
∗ > 0. If A⊥XW and W −X ↑sst X, then J and E
x(u′(W −P ∗)−λ0)
are decreasing. If J(0) ≤ 0 then J < 0, but we would then have X3 = (0, x¯] by
Proposition A.3. Hence J(0) > 0 and the contract is initially full insurance, again by
Proposition A.3, as P ∗ > 0. If γ = 1, it follows by Proposition 5.2 that no insurance
must be offered on a nonnegligible set. The same conclusion holds if 0 ≤ γ < 1, by
Proposition 5.1. Therefore in both cases we have X3 6= ∅. But then J must cross zero
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once at x1 ∈ (0, x) and X3 = (x1, x], by Proposition A.3. Focusing then on the set
(0, x¯1), when γ = 1 we have X2 = (0, x1] and X1 = (x1, x1), with x1 the first zero of J .
When 0 ≤ γ < 1, on every subinterval of (0, x¯1) where J < 0, and in particular on an
interval (xlast, x1), where xlast is the last zero of J , the contract offers coinsurance, and
on the remaining sets the contract may offer full insurance.
Theorem 5.8
Proof. If we consider the premium as an additional state variable for problem (2.3), the
Hamiltonian is still given by H(x, I(x), λ0;P ) (see section 4), but with the premium
acting as a state variable rather than a constant. We define the maximized Hamiltonian
as
Ĥ(x, P, λ0) = max
z∈[0,x]
H(x, z, λ0;P ).
If H(x, z, λ0;P ) is concave in P , then Ĥ(x, ·, λ0) is concave (e.g. Seierstad and Sydsaeter,
1987, p. 164). This means that the Arrow condition applies and the necessary conditions
for optimality given by the Maximum principle are also sufficient (e.g. Seierstad and
Sydsaeter, 1987, p. 107). In particular, letting (Pˆ , Iˆ) denote an admissible insurance
contract with associated adjoint constant λˆ0 ≥ 0, we have that (Pˆ , Iˆ) is optimal if and
only if all the conditions of the Maximum Principle are satisfied. To prove concavity of
H(x, z, λˆ0;P ) in P , we compute the second order derivative (∂
2/∂P 2)H(x, I(x), λˆ0;P )
to obtain, after some calculations, the explicit expression
∂2
∂P 2
H(x, I(x), λˆ0;P ) = E
x
(
u′′(W˜ )1
A˜≥0
)
− fA(I(x)− P |x)
{
Ex
(
u′(W˜ )
∣∣A˜ = 0)− Ex (u′(W˜ )∣∣A˜ ≥ 0)
+ Ex
(
u′(W˜ )− γu′(W˜ (γ))
∣∣A˜ = 0)+ Ex (∆u(γ, I(x)) (lna fA(I(x)− P,W |x) + h(x)) ∣∣A˜ = 0)}.
Under A⊥XW , the above is clearly strictly negative for γ = 1. When γ = 0, imposing
the additional condition lna fA(I(x)− Pˆ |x) ≥ −h(x) is sufficient for the last term to be
nonnegative. The result then follows.
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Figure 1: Source: Guy Carpenter & Co., see Froot (2001)
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Figure 2: The coinsurance set is given by X1 = X
′
1 ∪ X
′′
2 , the full insurance set by X2, and the no
insurance set by X3. There is a deductible, x1 = x1, followed by coinsurance until x2 = x1,
and then full insurance. There is also an upper limit to full coverage at x3 = x2.
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Figure 3: Insurance coverage (I∗(x)) for different levels of fractional recovery. Assumptions: u(w) =
−e−αw, with α = 0.05 (note that in this case the efficient contract does not depend on the
insurance buyer’s wealth distribution); A,W,X independent; A log-normally distributed, with
A ∼ lnN (30, 15); X has Gamma distribution truncated at x¯ = 100 with mean 20 and standard
deviation 10; v = 30.
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Figure 4: Insurance coverage as a fraction of the exposure (I∗(x)/x) for different levels of fractional
recovery.
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